The Absolute Good & Ethical Judgements

In the Republic, Plato introduced his idea of the “Good.” He defends his interpretation of

the Good as a From in itself — wholesome, pure, and that of preeminent virtue. As described in

the Allegory of the Cave, the Good, for Plato, is that which resembles (or is derived from)

appropriate Forms. The Forms, he argues, are not of material substance, nor are they present in

our realm of existence. Rather, they are idle in another realm. The Absolute Good is a Platonic

Form in the Idle Realm (I will use this term hereafter) outside of our own, and that which we

presume as just and fair in our world is merely a shadow, or deliberation of the Absolute.

However, given the argument of there being two realms, what can we really say about virtuous

action? Ethical judgments? There is much to discuss if we are to take this theory seriously.

However, I will argue that Plato’s account on ethical judgments proves to be highly plausible,

given it provides a thorough investigation into what constitutes moral behavior, upon referencing

the Absolute [Form of] Good, for we are left with nothing but our own ill-minded will without it.

To better understand this idea of Absoluteness, we must first elaborate on what Platonic

Forms entail and why they are of necessity to Plato if we are to inquire about just, or good,

judgement. As mentioned in the Republic, the material world, or that which is evident to us

empirically, is of the lower bases of judgment. This idea is presumably concerned with the

consequences of taking empiricism seriously, which Platonists often regard as a grand error. The

Forms possess something other-worldly, something wholesome, and Plato argued that man is

simply not enough to maintain a pure, consistent guidance towards ethical judgment, hence we

relate to the Absolute. To better understand this concept of the idle, or Divine realm, we can

relate to one of the most prominent philosophers of his time, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

Kant, similarly to Plato, argued that that which is present in our realm, is derived (or deliberated)

from that which is in pure Form in the Idle Realm . However, Kant argued that the Absolute

could be understood as God — an omniscient being. If there is Good in the world, how did it

come to be if not from a “divine energy?” Did man create the Good? Did man create its

opposites? Kant argued in favor for God’s existence in another world, as Plato argued for the

Forms in the Idle Realm, as being the source and means for all that is of possibility in our world —

“even now the universe is permeated by the divine energy of an omnipotent Deity” (Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

On the contrary to Kant and Plato’s defense of this other-worldly source for moral

existence, Empiricists argued in defense of our sense experiences and feelings (or emotions). The

central claim for Empiricism is as follows: “we have no source of knowledge in S or for the

concepts we use in S other than sense experience” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). For

Plato, as we have noted, Empiricism is rejected in many respects, primarily because it denies a

source for knowledge or judgment outside of our own ideas. Since sense data and experience is all

we have as to being the source of our ideas, the Platonic Forms reject this notion. However, we

can see why this theory of sense experience as a basis of moral guidance is commonly defended,

given that most of our judgments are reliant on that which we can perceive, and then process in

our minds (i.e., you witness your significant other cheating on you, and act according to your own

emotions). One of the most respected philosophers of the 18th Century, David Hume

(1711-1776), argued for this theory, however he had much more to say than the minimal, central

claim of the Empirical thesis, particularly that which concerns our sentiments and sympathy for

others when dealing with ethical judgment. Hume’s basis for the Good is reliant on his Empirical

theory of mind, contrary to that of Plato’s. He did not believe in the idea of this Idle Realm of

Forms, but rather, he argued that “moral good and evil are like heat, cold, and colors… which

are experienced directly by sensation, but about which we form beliefs” (Stanford Encyclopedia

of Philosophy). Hume believed moral sentiments to be derived from moral approval and

disapproval. Meaning, if a judgment is unethical, then the greater number of people will

disapprove. On the contrary, if an action is virtuous, then we tend to see society praising that

action when they see fit. Hume argues that this is the reason why we think deceiving your spouse

is immoral, yet helping a dying homeless man is moral — we have tested these actions, and

generally have come to an agreement on behalf of their aftermath. He wrote, “some common

point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the

same to all of them” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

However, Platonists argue that if we are to solely base our knowledge on that which is

self-evident, or perceivable through the human eye (and other senses), we would, more often than

not fall short of thorough investigation into the propositions in which we encounter concerning the                                                essentce of existnce for morality. More so, there remains a great deal of unanswered questions 
that the Empiricist will either attempt, yet fail to answer, or will come to accept its own limitations 
regarding the matter. The argument here requires clarification. If we are to regard Hume’s theory of
moral sentiment seriously, then we must ask ourselves if the Good (or ‘good,’ for Hume), 
which is seemingly accepted as universally correct without a source making it so (other than man), 
could be different in another possible world, that which differs from the one we are in today. 
If these commonalities regarding our moral action and judgment are grounded on the consensus of men, 
then we could simply come to a consensus regarding that which opposes the general commonalities
concerning moral behavior that we have come to accept. Also, who is to say that we’ve got it all wrong? 
Only our own sentiment. Arguably, this theory would place us in an endless cycle of impaired judgments,

given we are unsure as to what is moral (what is right), and what is not, since we create, or rather

decide, what we perceive to be good and what we perceive to lack goodness. In order to better

demonstrate the unreliability of Hume’s sentiment-based ethical theory, let us think of why we

have come to a consensus regarding moral behavior. Better yet, why do we feel bad when we lie to

another person, or hurt their feelings? Is their negative response to this action all there is to say

regarding why it is wrong? Seemingly, there is more to it than that.

Plato’s Forms and Kant’s Divine Realm attempt to solve these moral problems. Through

their ethical theories, whether it be the Platonic Forms or a Divine Being, we can derive virtue in

a much more special manner. Meaning, we no longer conclude that hurting someone’s feelings is

morally wrong because they respond negatively, but because it is inherently wrong to hurt

someone, regardless of their response. Let us imagine a case where one requests to be physically

beaten, and society agrees that it is morally permissible to do so, given their consent. Why would

Hume argue against it? And if he were to, what logical reasoning could he use other than that

which is reliant on the negative emotions you would (presumably) feel when doing so — we

would not find the answer we are looking for. Through cases like this, and others that we would

find to be more common, we would ultimately run in circles with the empiricist theory of mind.

Hence, it seems clear to us that what makes some particular action moral or immoral is not

reliant on mere sentiment — there is something more special about ethics. Plato wants us to

arrive to this conclusion, and we can only due so by deeply considering why our ethics mean

more to us than almost anything else. The character we develop surely is not reliant solely on the

negative or positive responses we get from others, but rather is concerned with the essence of our

goodness or badness — who we are. Although this philosophy is special and shared by many,

Empiricism would ultimately fail to provide reasons as to why this is so. Platonic Absoluteness

treats the Good and the Virtuous more seriously, and asks of us to commit to something greater

than ourselves, whether it be a Creator of these Forms, or an Idle Realm, in which we aspire to

relate to as much as we can.